Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MİT) took over facilities of the Joint Staff Electronic Systems Command (GES) based 20 kilometers south of Ankara officially as of Jan. 1, but case officers, engineers and technicians started their workday as of 9 a.m. Jan. 2.

This is not an ordinary bureaucratic shift; on the contrary, it is one of the strongest symbols of increasing civilian control over the Turkish military. The GES facilities, known as the “Bayrak” (Flag) Garrison, played an important role in the planning phase of the Sept. 12, 1980 coup d’etat by the Joint Staff; so important that Kenan Evren and fellow generals had code named the whole coup operation as the “Bayrak” operation.

Established in the 1950’s as a NATO communications facility by the U.S. in order to collect intelligence on Soviet activities and then transferred to Turkish army, the GES facilities have the most sophisticated electronic communication and thus eavesdropping devices in the Turkish system. Its capacities completely for military purposes, such as sustaining the communications with Turkish troops abroad from Afghanistan to Somalia and Kosovo or field intelligence for army commands in Turkey, will continue to stay under the Joint Staff. But the rest, all those cutting edge technology listening devices which have been and could be used for civilian purposes are under MİT as of yesterday; the consolidation work started almost a year ago.

It is important for the MİT, which is going to mark its 85 anniversary on Friday Jan. 6, since up until 15 years ago it used to be mostly under military control; a three star army general used to rule it with many key posts being under military officials. Today, the MİT is working under its fourth civilian undersecretary (directly reporting to Prime Minister) and engulfing military intelligence in national capacity.

Yet those important developments take place amid a series of controversies about the Turkish secret service’s performance for the last year, after the appointment to the leading post of Hakan Fidan, who opposition parties have regarded as a political appointee of PM Tayyip Erdoğan.

A few months ago, secret MİT talks with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) representatives in Europe (probably in Oslo, Norway) were leaked to the internet media. Nowadays, MİT is again the target of criticism because of providing misleading information to the military which ended up of killing of 35 small-scale smuggling villagers at Turkish-Iraqi border, mistaken as PKK militants.

The whispers in the security community claim there is a competition from the police intelligence who don’t want to be under MİT control, on the contrary seeking a separate FBI-style domestic intelligence structure which indirectly contributes to the discrediting leak stories. The sources say the competition is especially on sharing the intelligence on the PKK; the most sensitive issue for Turkey’s security now.

Nevertheless, civilian intelligence taking over the control of the military facilities has an important significance in Turkey’s painful politics and military relationship and will be marked as such.

The government’s “dismissive attitude” after a botched air raid killed 35 civilians in Southeast Anatolia has led to a drastic shift of sentiment among peaceful, non-militant Kurds in the area, a senior Republican People’s Party (CHP) official has said.

“It was a disaster in which the most advanced of aircraft killed innocent civilians, but the government adopted a dismissive attitude. It is a breaking point. The government’s attitude profoundly hurt the people in the region,” CHP deputy chairman Sezgin Tanrıkulu told the Hürriyet Daily News yesterday.

Tanrıkulu, himself a Kurd, traveled to the area after the Dec. 28 bombing and accompanied CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu on the weekend when he visited the families of the victims in the village of Gülyazı to convey his condolences.

Tanrıkulu said the slain youths did not have any incendiary political inclinations and the settlement provided “village guards,” or government-armed men who support the army in the fight against the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

“The identity of those killed is not of a nature that would have provoked a huge outburst of anger. There were village guard families there. The youths were living in the village and had not gone to the mountains [to join the PKK]. But the way the government reacted after the incident led to an outburst of anger,” he said.

‘Deliberate strike’

“The government underestimated the incident,” Tanrıkulu said. “The people now have the perception that no matter what they do, they are being killed brutally. They are left with the impression that the strike was deliberate.”

The CHP deputy chair said the government could still win over the region by taking political responsibility for the raid and determining those responsible for the misleading intelligence that prompted the bombing.
He declined to comment on how the incident might have unfolded, but argued that negligence could not be the only cause.

“I would not speculate but I think there are factors beyond negligence. When warplanes take off, the risk of an error must be zero. But it in this incident, it seems that the possibility of no error was close to zero,” he said.
The 35, who were smuggling diesel in from northern Iraq, were killed Dec. 28 when the military bombed the group after mistaking them for members of the PKK, which is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

The Turkish military is slated to acquire several weapons systems to use against terrorists from the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) this year, one senior procurement official said last week.
Italy’s AgustaWestland and Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) have been collaborating on building the T-129 attack helicopter, a Turkish version of the company’s A129 Mangusta International.

AgustaWestland is scheduled to deliver the first nine of a planned 59 helicopters to the military toward the end of 2012.

Turkish authorities then will assemble the required weapons systems on the platforms, and the nine helicopter gunships are expected to enter service in 2013, the official said.

Separately, the United States is expected to deliver three AH-1W Super Cobra attack helicopters early this year. The U.S. Congress approved the sale of these three choppers, worth $125 million, toward the end of 2012.

Additionally, TAI, Turkey’s state-owned aerospace powerhouse, is scheduled to deliver to the military three Anka Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicles in 2012, to be used for reconnaissance purposes, the official said.

Turkey is already operating nine Israeli-made Heron MALE drones against the PKK. The United States has also deployed another four RQ-1 Predator MALE drones at Turkey’s southern İncirlik airbase to fly over PKK camps in northern Iraq and provide the Turkish military intelligence.

Additionally Turkey has requested to buy four RQ-1 Predator reconnaissance drones and two armed MQ-1 Reapers, but the U.S. has not responded to the request.

In addition to its MALE drone capabilities, the Turkish military operates scores of smaller drones.

Unmanned vehicles

TAI’s efforts to develop and produce the Anka have seen a delay of several years. “Attack helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles are among the most effective weapons against terrorists, and we will have an abundance of these weapons soon,” said one security official.

The PKK this year intensified terrorist attacks against Turkish military and civilian targets, causing a public outrage.

Separately, the U.S. Boeing is expected to deliver the first of a planned four spy planes to the Turkish Air Force in 2012. The program to manufacture the four Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) aircraft is worth more than $1.6 billion and is behind schedule a few years.

The Defense Industry Executive Committee, Turkey’s highest procurement agency, is also expected to select a foreign company in Turkey’s $4 billion long range air and missile defense system program. Among the candidates competing to build an air and missile defense system with Turkish partners are U.S. companies Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, with their Patriot Air and Missile Defense System; Russian Rosoboronexport’s S-300; Chinese CPMIEC’s (China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corp.) HQ-9; and European Eurosam’s SAMP/T Aster 30.

The Defense Industry Executive Committee’s members include Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Defense Minister İsmet Yılmaz, Chief of the Turkish General Staff Gen. Necdet Özel and Procurement Chief Murad Bayar.

Finally, the committee would select a national commercial shipyard which will manufacture the third through the eighth of the Milgem national corvettes. The first two corvettes were built at a military shipyard. The first corvette, the TCG Heybeliada, already has entered service in the Navy, and the second, the TCG Büyükada, has been put to sea for tests.

Despite Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s leadership, oncoming presidential elections along with the lack of coordination, eclectic strategies and challenges of the struggle may hinder the government from making radical decisions.

Since the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan was isolated and the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK) operations have obstructed its control over people, the PKK is likely to establish its strategy of exiting from chaos upon “more action.” It will likely try to force the government to increase quid pro quo agreements. It would not be surprising if the PKK maintains implementing its hybrid strategy of guerilla, terror and street movements next spring.

While the Arab Spring and events in Syria provide the PKK with a psychological advantage, disarray in Iraq, Iran and other developments will strengthen its position.
Resuming the collapsed PKK-government negotiations and building confidence will depend on compensation for the efforts.

The race to obtain popular support might trigger clashes between the PKK and the Gülen movement, which changes the character of the PKK problem. As a result, the struggle between the government and the PKK will likely continue on the “bargaining bar.”
Despite everything, the government will survive the hardships for its ability to “manage” problems.